UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-13-2016

Anderson v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43800

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Anderson v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43800" (2016). Not Reported. 2993.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2993

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
WAYNE D. ANDERSON, II,

)
)
No. 43800
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
Canyon County Case No.
v.
)
CV-2015-3509
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Defendant-Respondent.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. NYE
District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

BEN P. McGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
P. O. Box 2816
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings .................................. 1
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5
Anderson Has Failed To Show That The District Court
Abused Its Discretion By Denying His Motions For A
Third Extension Of Time To Respond To The Notice
Of Intent To Dismiss, To Discharge His Counsel, And
To Proceed Pro Se .................................................................................... 5
A.

Introduction ..................................................................................... 5

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 5

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion
In Denying Anderson’s Pro Se Motions........................................... 6

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 11

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1989) .................................................. 8
Bittick v. State, 105 S.W.3d 498 (Mo. App. 2003)................................................. 6
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) ............................... 5
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ............................................................ 6
Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 320 P.3d 1284 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................... 6
Idaho State Bar Ass’n v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
102 Idaho 672, 637 P.2d 1168 (1981) ....................................................... 7
In re Jerry Chapman, 581 A.2d 1041 (Vt. 1990) ................................................... 6
Isom v. State, 953 So. 2d 604 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ....................................... 6
Leonard v. State, 461 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1990).................................................... 5
Lovin v. State, 286 S.W.3d 275 (Tenn. 2009) ....................................................... 7
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.,
528 U.S. 152 (2000) .................................................................................. 6
McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974) .................................................. 7
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014) ......................................... 9
Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803 (11th Cir. 1984) ...................................... 8
Smith v. Baptiste, 694 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. 2010) ........................................................ 7
State v. Anderson, 156 Idaho 230, 322 P.3d 312 (Ct. App. 2014) ........................ 1
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App. 2007) ............................ 8
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008) ........................................... 6
State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 569 P.2d 916 (1977) .............................................. 6
State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998).............................................. 6
ii

United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1991) ........................................... 8
Weston v. Gritman Mem’l Hosp., 99 Idaho 717, 587 P.2d 1252 (1978)................ 7
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1654 .................................................................................................. 7
RULES
I.R.C.P. 61 ............................................................................................................ 9

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wayne D. Anderson, II, appeals from the district court’s order summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition.
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
In February 2012, pursuant to an agreement with the state, Anderson
entered an Alford1 plea to one count of lewd conduct with a minor.

(See

R., pp.65-70.) Prior to sentencing, Anderson moved to withdraw the plea on the
ground that his wife coerced him into pleading guilty. (See R., pp.44-48.) The
district court denied the motion, as well as Anderson’s motion for reconsideration.
(Id.); State v. Anderson, 156 Idaho 230, 232-233, 322 P.3d 312, 314-315
(Ct. App. 2014). The court then imposed a unified 40-year sentence with 15
years fixed.

(R., pp.49-50.)

On direct appeal, Anderson alleged that his

sentence was excessive and that the district court erred by denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Anderson, 156 Idaho at 233-237, 322 P.3d at 315-319.
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the determinations of the district court. Id.
In April 2015, Anderson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp.4-15.) Anderson alleged that this trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
present certain evidence regarding Anderson’s mental health issues to the
district court prior to the entry of his guilty plea, and in support of the subsequent
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Id.) The district court granted Anderson’s

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in the post-conviction
proceeding. (R., pp.27-28.)
On July 29, 2015, the district court entered its notice of intent to dismiss
the post-conviction petition on the ground that Anderson failed to allege facts
which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief on any of his post-conviction
claims. (R., pp.80-91.) Pursuant to the notice, Anderson had until August 14,
2015, to respond with an amended petition or additional evidence. (R., p.90.)
After the court granted two requests from Anderson’s counsel to extend the time
to respond, Anderson’s response became due on October 10, 2015. (R., pp.9296, 99-103.)

In his two motions for extensions of time, Anderson’s counsel

represented to the court that he had reviewed the underlying criminal file, met
with Anderson’s trial counsel, communicated with staff at the Canyon County Jail
about obtaining records regarding Anderson’s mental health and behavior while
incarcerated, communicated with Anderson about the evidentiary hurdles facing
his post-conviction claims, and initiated an investigation of potential witnesses.
(R., pp.93,100.)
On October 14, 2015, Anderson filed pro se motions requesting an
additional continuance so he could discharge his appointed counsel, represent
himself, and file an amended pro se petition. (R., pp.104-105.) In the motion,
Anderson asserted that his post-conviction counsel had provided ineffective
assistance. (Id.) At a status conference held on October 19, 2015, the district
court considered the pro se motions filed by Anderson.

(Tr., p.3, Ls.5-9.)

Anderson’s counsel represented to the court that his investigator had followed up

2

with the potential witnesses identified to him by Anderson, but that he was unable
to obtain evidence sufficient to support an amended post-conviction petition.
(Tr., p.3, Ls.14-18.) Therefore, Anderson’s counsel continued, he would not be
filing an amended petition. (Tr., p.3, Ls.19-25.)
The district court denied Anderson’s pro se motions. (R., pp.108-109;
Tr., p.4, Ls.1-7.) The court concluded that Anderson had not provided any facts
to warrant a third extension of time.

(Tr., p.4, Ls.1-3.)

The court further

concluded that because Anderson had no constitutional right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel, Anderson’s assertion of ineffective
assistance was not a valid basis upon which to grant his motions. (Tr., p.4, Ls.47.) The district court then summarily dismissed the post-conviction petition on
the grounds previously set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.110-121;
Tr., p.4, Ls.7-9.) Anderson timely appealed. (R., pp.122-124.)

3

ISSUE
Anderson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied
Mr. Anderson’s motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss
court-appointed counsel, and extend his time to prepare an
amended petition?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Anderson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motions for a third extension of time to respond to the notice of intent
to dismiss, to discharge his counsel, and to proceed pro se?

.
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ARGUMENT
Anderson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Motions For A Third Extension Of Time To Respond To The Notice
Of Intent To Dismiss, To Discharge His Counsel, And To Proceed Pro Se
A.

Introduction
Anderson contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying

several pro se motions he filed prior to the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition.

(See generally Appellant’s brief.)

Specifically, Anderson

contends that the district court erred in failing to continue the post-conviction
proceeding a third time to allow Anderson to discharge his appointed counsel,
represent himself, and file an amended pro se post-conviction petition.

(Id.)

Anderson’s arguments fail because he had no constitutional or statutory right to
self-representation in a post-conviction proceeding, and because the district court
acted well within its discretion in declining to further delay the case where
Anderson had provided no valid basis to do so.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies

within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,
792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). For the reasons discussed below, the state
submits that it is likewise a matter of the district court’s discretion whether to
permit a post-conviction petitioner to discharge his counsel and proceed pro se
after counsel has been appointed. See Leonard v. State, 461 N.W.2d 465, 468
(Iowa 1990) (“Discretion to deny counsel [in a post-conviction proceeding], we
think, necessarily implies discretion to deny dispensing with counsel.”)
5

Decisions relating to whether to grant a party’s motion for a continuance
are also within the discretion of the court. State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 574,
569 P.2d 916, 919 (1977).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Denying Anderson’s
Pro Se Motions
In a post-conviction proceeding, the decision to grant or deny a motion for

a continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Hall v. State,
156 Idaho 125, 131, 320 P.3d 1284, 1290 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Payne,
146 Idaho 548, 567, 199 P.3d 123, 142 (2008); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88,
106, 967 P.2d 702, 720 (1998)). In order to prevail on appeal, the petitioner must
show that the trial court abused its discretion and that his substantial rights have
been prejudiced. Id. (citing Payne, 146 Idaho at 567, 199 P.3d at 142.)
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right of self-representation which
derives from the Sixth Amendment. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818
(1975). However, this right of self-representation does not extend to either direct
appeals or post-conviction proceedings. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal.,
Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (a defendant has no
constitutional right of self-representation in a direct appeal of a criminal
conviction); Isom v. State, 953 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (the
post-conviction court has discretion as to whether to discharge appointed postconviction counsel); In re Jerry Chapman, 581 A.2d 1041, 1043-1044 (Vt. 1990)
(constitutional right to self-representation is inapplicable in post-conviction relief
proceeding); Bittick v. State, 105 S.W.3d 498, 501 (Mo. App. 2003) (“The [United

6

States]

Supreme

Court

has

not

determined

whether

an

incarcerated

postconviction motion civil litigant has the same right to self-representation”
(footnote omitted).).
Further, while some states and the federal government provide for a right
of self-representation in collateral proceedings through state constitutions and
statutes (see, e.g., Smith v. Baptiste, 694 S.E.2d 83, 91 (Ga. 2010) (“Even today
the right of self-representation in federal civil cases is protected only by statute”
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654) (emphasis in original); McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d
85, 90-91 (Alaska 1974) (holding that the Alaska constitution guarantees a right
to self-representation in a post-conviction proceeding), the Idaho appellate courts
have not recognized such a state constitutional or statutory right to selfrepresentation in Idaho post-conviction proceedings.
To the extent, as Anderson asserts on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11),
that there is a common law right to self-representation in Idaho civil cases,2 the
state submits that this right, even if it applies to convicted criminal defendants in
post-conviction petition proceedings, is not absolute. Instead, a court may weigh
factors, such as its interest in the efficient resolution of cases, in determining
whether to permit a post-conviction petitioner to discharge counsel. See, e.g.,
Lovin v. State, 286 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Tenn. 2009) (“When a prisoner desires to
2

For this proposition, Anderson cites Weston v. Gritman Mem’l Hosp., 99 Idaho
717, 720, 587 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1978) and Idaho State Bar Ass’n v. Idaho Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, 102 Idaho 672, 676, 637 P.2d 1168, 1172 (1981). (Appellant’s
brief, p.9.) In both of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court noted, in dicta, that
an individual has an “inherent” right to represent himself, but that this right did not
extend to the representation of other entities. The Idaho Supreme Court did not
specifically identify the source of this right or define its parameters and
limitations.
7

discharge a retained lawyer [in a post-conviction proceeding], the appropriate
focus is on balancing the prisoner’s right to discharge his or her lawyer against
the court’s obligation to administer justice efficiently by avoiding unreasonable
delay.” (citations omitted)).
Therefore, as Anderson ultimately acknowledges on appeal (see generally
Appellant’s brief), it is a matter left to the district court’s discretion whether to
permit a post-conviction petitioner to discharge his appointed counsel and
proceed pro se. In this case, Anderson has failed to demonstrate that the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motions because he failed to show any
valid basis for discharging his appointed counsel and subjecting the postconviction proceeding to additional delay.
First, Anderson’s requests were untimely.

Even in the context of the

established constitutional right of self-representation at a criminal trial, a court
may consider the timeliness of the request for self-representation in determining
whether to grant the request. See State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d
512, 523 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737, 742–743
(7th Cir. 1991); Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989); Raulerson
v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 808 (11th Cir. 1984)). In this case, Anderson did
not request that he be permitted to represent himself until approximately six
months after the court granted his motion for appointment of counsel (R., pp.2728), approximately two and one-half months after the court entered its notice of
intent to summarily dismiss the petition (R., pp.80-91), and only after Anderson’s
appointed counsel requested, and was granted, two extensions of time to

8

respond to the court’s notice (R., pp.92-96, 99-103). The district court
appropriately considered the late timing of Anderson’s request (Tr., p.3, Ls.11-13;
p.4, L.3), and acted within its discretion to prevent further delays.
Further, as the court also noted (Tr., p.4, Ls.1-3), Anderson’s requests
were not supported by any evidence or assertions that warranted the case being
delayed further. Anderson did not explain what evidence he would have been
able to obtain, as an in-custody pro se inmate, if only he had more time to do so,
or how such evidence would have cured the defects in his post-conviction
petition.

(See R., pp.104-105.)

Anderson likewise failed to allege or

demonstrate that his attorney’s representations to the court about the
fruitlessness of the investigation were incorrect. (See id.) Anderson was not
automatically entitled to discharge his counsel and proceed pro se just because
he was apparently not pleased with his counsel’s conclusions.
Finally, as the district court also correctly recognized (Tr., p.4, Ls.4-6),
Anderson’s assertion that his post-conviction counsel provided ineffective
assistance could not provide a valid basis to discharge counsel and continue the
case in these circumstances because there is no constitutional right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. See Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho
389, 391, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014).
In the alternative, even if the district court abused its discretion by failing to
permit Anderson to discharge his appointed counsel, such error is harmless
because the court, as discussed above, acted well within its discretion in denying
Anderson’s motion for a continuance. See I.R.C.P. 61 (“the court must disregard
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any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.”) In this case, even if Anderson had the right to discharge his
counsel, his post-conviction petition would still have been summarily dismissed
after the district court denied the motion to continue the case.

Therefore,

Anderson cannot demonstrate prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, Anderson has failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion by denying his motions for a third extension of time to
respond to the notice of intent to dismiss, to discharge his counsel, and to
proceed pro se in the post-conviction proceeding.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order denying Anderson’s pro se motions, and its order summarily dismissing
Anderson’s post-conviction petition.
DATED this 13th day of October, 2016.
__/s/ Mark W. Olson____
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of October, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

MWO/dd

_/s/ Mark W. Olson______
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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